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IS LIMITED REMAND REQUIRED IF THE 
DISTRICT COURT ADMITTED OR EXCLUDED 
EVIDENCE WITHOUT A DAUBERT ANALYSIS? 
Robert B. Gilbreath* 
I. INTRODUCTION
How a federal court of appeals disposes of a case after 
ruling on the merits depends on two federal statutes. Under 28 
U.S.C. § 2111, a federal court of appeals may not reverse in the 
absence of harmful error.1 Under 28 U.S.C. § 2106, once the 
court has determined that harmful error occurred, it may dispose 
of the appeal by directing the trial court to hold any further 
proceedings that may be appropriate.2
This article discusses the interplay between those statutes 
when the trial court has admitted or excluded evidence without 
first making the proper threshold finding on admissibility.3 In 
that situation, the question arises whether an appellate court 
must, instead of ordering a new trial, remand with instructions to 
the trial court to (i) determine whether the evidence was 
inadmissible, or if the court originally excluded the evidence, 
*Mr. Gilbreath is a partner at Hawkins Parnell Thackston & Young LLP in Dallas, where 
he serves as Appellate and Legal Issues Practice Group Leader.  
 1. 28 U.S.C. § 2111 (2015) (providing that “the court shall give judgment after an 
examination of the record without regard to errors or defects which do not affect the 
substantial rights of the parties”), available at http://uscode.house.gov. 
 2. 28 U.S.C. § 2106 (2015) (providing that the court “may affirm, modify, vacate, set 
aside or reverse any judgment, decree, or order . . . and . . . may remand the cause and 
direct the entry of such appropriate judgment, decree, or order, or require such further 
proceedings to be had as may be just under the circumstances”), available at http://us 
code.house.gov. 
 3. See Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 594–97 (1993) 
(discussing admission of scientific and technical evidence; recognizing gatekeeper role of 
trial judge, who is charged with determining whether expert testimony rests on necessary 
foundation and is relevant to matters at issue; and noting that standard of admissibility 
must be flexible). 
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whether the evidence was instead admissible, and (ii) order a 
new trial if admitted evidence should have been excluded or 
excluded evidence should have been admitted. This article takes 
the position that the federal courts of appeals should retain the 
power to decide this question on a case-by-case basis.
II. DAUBERT GATEKEEPING ERRORS ARE NOT ALWAYS
GROUNDS FOR REVERSAL
Recently, an en banc panel of the Ninth Circuit considered 
the question of how to dispose of an appeal after determining 
that the trial court erred by admitting expert testimony without 
performing its gatekeeping role. In Estate of Barabin v. 
AstenJohnson, Inc., the court found the admission of the 
testimony to have been harmful error, reversed the trial court’s 
judgment, and remanded for a new trial.4 The Barabin court 
recognized the necessity of finding harmful error before a 
mistake in ruling on admissibility is deemed to require reversal,5
and it implicitly acknowledged that reversal would be 
unnecessary if the record demonstrated that the expert testimony 
was in fact admissible.6 But the court nonetheless concluded that 
the error was harmful because the appellees’ claim depended 
wholly on the erroneously admitted evidence, and held that a 
new trial was required because the record was too sparse to 
determine whether the expert testimony satisfied the Daubert
requirements.7
The appellees sought review in the Supreme Court, 
asserting that remand for new trial was improper because 
without a ruling on whether the evidence was indeed admissible 
under Daubert, the court of appeals could not have properly 
 4. 740 F.3d 457, 460 (9th Cir.) (en banc), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 135 S. Ct. 55 
(2014).
5. Id. at 465 (discussing court’s procedure in two earlier cases, noting specifically that 
“we engaged in harmless error review, found that the error was not harmless, and 
remanded for a new trial” in one case and “went straight to harmless error review, found 
the evidence to be prejudicial, and remanded for a new trial” in the other) (internal citations 
omitted). 
6. Id. at 467. 
7. Id. at 465–67. 
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found harmful error.8 They also argued that, in contrast to other 
circuits, both the Ninth and Tenth Circuits were applying an 
automatic-new-trial rule in cases in which a district court failed 
to perform its Daubert gatekeeping role.9 They urged the 
Supreme Court to create a limited-remand rule for this situation.  
The rule that they proposed would require remand for the 
limited purpose of the trial court’s undertaking the Daubert
analysis that it neglected to perform in the first instance, rather 
than remanding for a new trial. If, and only if, the district court 
concludes that it erred in admitting (or excluding) the expert 
testimony would a new trial be required. 
This limited-remand rule would come into play when a 
district court erred in failing to perform its Daubert gatekeeping 
duty, and the court of appeals could not deem the error harmless. 
Thus, the rule would apply only if it was not readily apparent 
from the appellate record that (i) the expert testimony was either 
admissible or inadmissible, and (ii) other competent evidence 
was not sufficiently strong to permit the conclusion that the 
improper admission or exclusion of the evidence had no effect 
on the decision. 
III. REQUIRING REMAND FOR GATEKEEPING ERRORS
WOULD FRUSTRATE CONGRESSIONAL INTENT
A. An Analysis of 28 U.S.C. § 2106 
A limited-remand rule would run afoul of Congress’s 
expressed intent in 28 U.S.C. § 2106. When a district court fails 
to comply with its Daubert gatekeeping duty, it commits error. 
What to do about that error is a matter committed to the 
appellate court’s sound discretion under § 2106.10 Exercise of 
that discretion by the court of appeals, and its choice of 
remedies, is informed by the character and degree of harm 
resulting from the district court’s error.
8. See Pet. for Writ of Certiorari at 10–18, Barabin v. AstenJohnson, Inc., No. 13-
1252, 2014 WL 1494074 (Apr. 15, 2014). 
 9. Id. at 10, 18–21. 
10. See United States v. Edwards, 728 F.3d 1286, 1296–97 (11th Cir. 2013) (observing 
that under § 2106, courts of appeals have broad discretion to grant relief as may be just 
under the circumstances). 
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Under § 2106, it is left to the courts of appeals to 
determine, after concluding that error has been committed, what 
further proceedings are “just under the circumstances.”11 The 
Fifth Circuit has, for example, explained that “[o]nce 
jurisdiction attaches, Courts of Appeals have broad authority to 
dispose of district court judgments as they see fit.”12 This 
includes the authority to, among other things, grant a new trial in 
the interest of justice.13
The First Circuit has explained the difference between the 
§ 2111 issue (whether there is harmful error) and the § 2106 
issue (the remedy for trial-court error) in a case where the 
district court excluded an expert’s testimony under Daubert:
[W]hen a trial court erroneously excludes evidence, and the 
exclusion meets the standard criteria of harmfulness, the 
harm is not cured by a mere possibility that other 
appropriate grounds for exclusion of the same evidence 
may later be found to exist. The question is one of degree 
and the choice of remedies (including whether to require a 
new trial or merely remand for further findings) is ours.14
This observation applies equally when the district court’s 
admission of evidence ran afoul of Daubert. The resulting harm 
is not cured by a mere possibility that appropriate grounds for 
admitting the evidence may later be found to exist. That said, the 
character and degree of harm informs the court’s choice of 
remedies. And in that situation, whether to remand for a new 
 11. 28 U.S.C. § 2106. 
12. GuideOne Specialty Mut. Ins. Co. v. Missionary Church of Disciples of Jesus 
Christ, 687 F.3d 676, 682 n.3 (5th Cir. 2012) (citing § 2106); see also U.S. Aviation 
Underwriters, Inc. v. Pilatus Bus. Aircraft, Ltd., 582 F.3d 1131, 1145 (10th Cir. 2009) 
(“When a district court enters a judgment with a legally insufficient basis, this court has 
three options: (1) order the entry of judgment as a matter of law, (2) order a new trial, or 
(3) remand to the district court to decide the appropriate option.”); Smith v. Washington 
Sheraton Corp., 135 F.3d 779, 783 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (“Having concluded that the district 
court erred in denying [defendant’s] motion for judgment as a matter of law, we have three 
choices. We may enter judgment for that party, or we may order a new trial, or we may 
remand the case to the district court to determine whether a new trial is appropriate.”). 
13. Samuels v. Health & Hosp. Corp. of N.Y., 591 F.2d 195, 199 (2d Cir. 1979) (noting 
that “an appellate court has the authority to grant a new trial in the interest of justice”). 
14. Ruiz-Troche v. Pepsi Cola of Puerto Rico Bottling Co., 161 F.3d 77, 88 (1st Cir. 
1998) (citing § 2106). 
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trial or to remand solely for further findings is the court of 
appeals’ choice to make under § 2106.15
The federal courts of appeals do not adhere, and should not 
be required to adhere, to a rigid limited-remand rule when the 
district court has erred in making or failing to make a threshold 
admissibility determination. In some cases involving this type of 
error, a federal court of appeals will, in the exercise of its broad 
discretion, properly conclude that although the district court’s 
error was not harmless, a limited remand is appropriate.16 But in 
other cases, a federal court of appeals may properly exercise its 
discretion under § 2106 by concluding that a remand for a new 
trial is the appropriate remedy.17
In one case, for example, the district court excluded expert 
testimony without first conducting a Daubert analysis.18 The 
Sixth Circuit held that it was not harmless error because “the 
complexion of the proceedings would likely have changed had 
the district court conducted a Daubert hearing and determined 
that [the expert’s] testimony was admissible.”19 Rather than 
ordering a limited remand for the district court to conduct the 
omitted Daubert analysis, the court of appeals reversed for a 
new trial.20
Similarly, the Seventh Circuit remanded for a new trial 
when the district court failed to conduct a proper Daubert
analysis in a case involving a defendant who sought to present 
expert testimony on false confessions and his susceptibility to 
coercion.21 The district court excluded the testimony without 
any indication that it applied the Daubert framework.22 The 
court of appeals neither decided that the excluded testimony was 
 15. See id.
16. See, e.g., United States v. Johnson, 388 F.3d 96, 102–03 (3d Cir. 2004) (remanding 
with instructions to district court to undertake weighing analysis); United States v. 
Downing, 753 F.2d 1224, 1244 (3d Cir. 1985) (remanding for evidentiary hearing). 
17. See, e.g., United States v. Sriyuth, 98 F.3d 739, 744 n.8 (3d Cir. 1996) (pointing out 
that a district court’s failure to make proper threshold admissibility determination “may 
require remand to the court for such proceedings or even for a new trial”). 
18. United States v. Smithers, 212 F.3d 306, 315 (6th Cir. 2000).  
19. Id. at 317. 
20. Id. at 318 & n.6. 
21. United States v. Hall, 93 F.3d 1337, 1341 (7th Cir. 1996). 
22. Id. at 1342 (noting that “we cannot be confident that the district court applied the 
Daubert framework,” because “[t]he judge never mentioned Daubert specifically, and thus 
he never focussed [sic] on the individual questions that must be answered”). 
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admissible under Daubert nor ordered a limited remand for the 
district court to make that determination, instead ordering a new 
trial because “[t]he district court’s failure to test the [proffered 
expert testimony] under [the Daubert] framework may have led 
to the exclusion of critical testimony.”23
Likewise, the Fifth Circuit has exercised its discretion to 
order a new trial under § 2106 when the district court failed to 
decide a threshold question of admissibility.24 On the other 
hand, however, the Fifth Circuit has also held a limited remand 
appropriate so that the district court could determine the 
admissibility issue in light of a new federal agency report issued 
after the district court made its initial admissibility 
determination.25 And the D.C. Circuit has also considered a 
limited remand for an admissibility hearing, but decided against 
ordering one.26
In short, under § 2106, it is up to the federal courts of 
appeals to decide, on a case-by-case basis, and in the exercise of 
their broad discretion, the proper disposition of each case on 
appeal.27 Thus far, the federal courts of appeals have taken 
various approaches to analyzing the necessity for remand when 
confronted with errors involving threshold admissibility rulings. 
Some have ordered limited remands, and some have remanded 
for new trials. The cases demonstrate, however, that the outcome 
always depends on case-specific factors. Imposing a rigid 
limited-remand rule would thwart the discretion that 
§ 2106 affords the federal courts of appeals in deciding how to 
dispose of the cases before them.  
23. Id. at 1346. 
24. See United States v. Lang, 8 F.3d 268, 271 (5th Cir. 1993) (pointing out that “the 
record indicates that the district court, at most, made only an initial determination . . . and 
left the ultimate determination . . . to the jury”).  
 25. LeBlanc v. Chevron USA, Inc., 275 F. App’x 319, 321 (5th Cir. 2008). 
26. Coleman v. United States, 397 F.2d 621, 621 (D.C. Cir. 1966) (exercising 
discretion under § 2106 to decide against remand and explaining that “a remand for hearing 
on the issue of admissibility alone [was] inappropriate” because “the trial judge’s reasons 
for refusing to resolve the admissibility issue were highly prejudicial”). 
27. See, e.g., Barabin, 730 F.3d at 456 (indicating that remand for new trial can be 
appropriate “[w]hen the district court has erroneously admitted or excluded prejudicial 
evidence,” and also when “the district court erred by failing to answer a threshold question 
of admissibility”); Kosty v. Lewis, 319 F.2d 744, 749 (D.C. Cir. 1963) (noting that § 2106 
“grants this Court broad discretion in the disposition of a case on appeal”); Morgan 
Guaranty Trust Co. of N.Y. v. Martin, 466 F.2d 593, 600 (7th Cir. 1972) (quoting Kosty). 
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B. An Analysis of 28 U.S.C. § 2111 
A rule requiring a limited remand to complete the harmful-
error analysis would frustrate the purpose of 28 U.S.C. § 2111. 
In that statute, Congress expressed its preference for 
determining harm by “case-specific application of judgment, 
based upon examination of the record.”28 And the Supreme 
Court has explained that the harmful-error analysis is intended 
to be flexible and without “rigid rules.”29 Thus, “[t]he factors 
that inform a reviewing court’s ‘harmless-error’ determination 
are various,”30 and include case-specific considerations like an 
“estimation of the likelihood that the result would have been 
different” and a “consideration of the error’s likely effects on the 
perceived fairness, integrity, or public reputation of judicial 
proceedings.”31 Consequently, the federal courts of appeals must 
refrain from generalizing too broadly about particular kinds of 
errors, and must remember that “the specific factual 
circumstances in which the error arises may well make all the 
difference.”32
Under this flexible analysis, the federal courts of appeals 
may properly find harmful error when a district court does not 
perform its gatekeeping obligation, and they may do so without 
ordering a limited remand solely for the purpose of determining 
admissibility. After all, establishing harmful error is not 
“particularly onerous,”33 and allowing a verdict to be based on 
expert testimony that has not first been vetted under Daubert
plainly implicates an appellant’s substantial rights.34
 28. Shinseki v. Sanders, 556 U.S. 396, 407 (2009); see also Kotteakos v. United States, 
328 U.S. 750, 761 (1946) (observing that proper application of the harmless error rule 
requires “judgment transcending confinement by formula or precise rule”). 
29. Shinseki, 556 U.S. at 407 (2009). 
30. Id. at 411. 
31. Id. at 411–12. 
32. Id. at 412. 
33. Id. at 410. 
34. Cf. Downing, 753 F.2d at 1226, 1243 (refusing to hold that district court’s error in 
failing to make threshold admissibility determination was harmless). It bears noting in this 
connection that an error is prejudicial—and so not harmless—when there is a reasonable 
probability that it affected the outcome of the trial. United States v. Marcus, 560 U.S. 258, 
262 (2010). And if the testimony is critical to the plaintiff’s case, the error plainly affects 
the outcome of the proceeding. Messner v. Northshore Univ. Health Sys., 669 F.3d 802, 
812–14 (7th Cir. 2012) (holding that district court’s failure to perform Daubert gatekeeping 
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A district court’s failure to abide by its Daubert
gatekeeping duty always affects “the perceived fairness, 
integrity, or public reputation of judicial proceedings.”35 This 
effect alone may not be sufficient to require reversal, but under 
the elastic harmful-error analysis, it is a factor to be considered. 
As the Supreme Court has said, “[o]ften the circumstances of the 
case will make clear to the appellate judge that the ruling, if 
erroneous, was harmful.”36 Ultimately, then, it is up to the 
federal courts of appeals to make the harmful-error decision on a 
case-by-case basis.37 And they are competent to do so.  
For example, the Sixth Circuit held that a district court’s 
error in excluding expert testimony without first conducting a 
Daubert analysis was not harmless because “the complexion of 
the proceedings would likely have changed had the district court 
conducted a Daubert hearing.”38 The Seventh Circuit, too, has 
held that when the district court excluded evidence without 
conducting a full Daubert analysis, the error was harmful 
because it “may have led to the exclusion of critical 
testimony.”39 And the First Circuit has also found a district 
court’s error in failing to conduct a Daubert analysis to be 
harmful because there was no basis in the record other than the 
expert’s testimony for the jury’s damages award.40
But the federal courts of appeals also routinely find this sort 
of error to be harmless. The Tenth Circuit has concluded, for 
example, that a district court’s failure to perform its gatekeeping 
role was harmless, and affirmed the district court’s judgment.41
analysis was harmful error because expert testimony played substantial role in district 
court’s class-certification ruling). 
35. Shinseki, 556 U.S. at 411–12. 
36. Id. at 410. 
37. See id. at 407–08. 
38. Smithers, 212 F.3d at 317 
39. Hall, 93 F.3d at 1346. 
40. Smith v. Jenkins, 732 F.3d 51, 65, 68–69 (1st Cir. 2013). 
 41. StorageCraft Tech. Corp. v. Kirby, 744 F.3d 1183, 1990–92 (10th Cir. 2014) 
(analyzing district court’s analysis and concluding that “more words from the district court 
would not have altered the admissibility of the expert’s evidence”). Even before 
StorageCraft, the Tenth Circuit had held that a district court’s error in failing to make 
Daubert findings before admitting expert testimony was harmless because the jury could 
properly have found the defendant guilty even without the expert’s testimony. United 
States v. Roach, 582 F.3d 1192, 1208 (10th Cir. 2009). Thus, a new trial is unnecessary 
when either (1) it is readily apparent from the record that the expert testimony was 
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Similarly, the Sixth Circuit has held that a district court’s failure 
to conduct a formal Daubert hearing amounted to harmless error 
because the expert’s testimony was cumulative.42 And the Ninth 
Circuit has held, on several occasions, that a district court’s 
Daubert gatekeeping error was harmless.43
In short, the courts of appeals are doing precisely what the 
Supreme Court said they should be doing: deciding the harmless 
error issue on a case-by-case basis by considering case-specific 
factors and by not generalizing too broadly about particular 
types of errors.44
IV. A LIMITED-REMAND RULE WOULD NOT
SERVE JUDICIAL ECONOMY
In this era of vacant judgeships, confirmation gridlock, and 
heavy judicial workloads,45 the federal courts of appeals cannot 
blind themselves to reality. Whatever the theoretical attractions 
of a limited-remand rule, it seems likely to result in the hearing 
of three appeals in many cases. If a federal court of appeals were 
to order a limited remand for a Daubert gatekeeping analysis in 
the first appeal brought in a case like Barabin, for example, the 
district court could conclude that the evidence was in fact 
admissible. In that event, the losing party might challenge that 
admissible, or—when the district court excluded evidence without making the necessary 
threshold determination—inadmissible, or (2) other competent evidence is sufficiently 
strong to permit the conclusion that the improper evidence had no effect on the decision. 
StorageCraft, 744 F.3d at 1191.
42. United States v. Smith, 27 F. App’x 577, 582 (6th Cir. 2001) (indicating that there 
was “overwhelming and diverse evidence” supporting the appellants’ convictions). 
43. United States v. Jawara, 474 F.3d 565, 583 (9th Cir. 2006) (opining that “[t]he lack 
of an explicit finding of reliability was harmless,” and citing earlier Ninth Circuit cases to 
the same effect); see also United States v. Blaine County, 363 F.3d 897, 915 (9th Cir. 
2004) (holding that “the district court made the necessary reliability determination with 
respect to [one expert’s] testimony and report,” and also holding that district court’s failure 
to make determination for other expert testimony was harmless because outcome was 
supported by evidence found to be reliable); United States v. Williams, 29 F. App’x 486, 
487 (9th Cir. 2002) (holding that district court’s failure to perform Daubert gatekeeping 
duty was harmless error). 
 44. See Shinseki, 556 U.S. at 407 (cautioning against use of “rigid rules”). 
 45. An analysis of the effects of these factors on the federal courts of appeals is beyond 
the scope of this article, but other commentators continue to consider and write about them. 
See, e.g., Andrew Adler, Extended Vacancies, Crushing Caseloads, and Emergency Panels 
in the Federal Courts of Appeals, 15 J. APP. PRAC. & PROCESS 163 (2014). 
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finding on appeal, resulting in the case’s coming before the 
court of appeals yet again.46 And if the court of appeals 
concludes on that second hearing that the district court erred in 
finding admissibility, the court of appeals could then remand for 
a new trial. The results of that trial would themselves be 
appealable, so the case might go up to the court of appeals for a 
third time. Remanding for a new trial in the first instance—
instead of ordering a limited remand—seems far more likely to 
generate only a single second appeal instead of leaving the door 
open to the third appeal that might be required to resolve a case 
in which the court chooses a limited remand.  
IV. CONCLUSION
Shortly after the en banc decision in Barabin, a panel of the 
Ninth Circuit reversed United States v. Christian,47 remanding 
for a new trial because the district court had not performed its 
Daubert gatekeeping obligation. But the court was careful to 
“emphasize that neither Barabin nor this decision requires a new 
trial whenever a district court errs in analyzing the admissibility 
of expert testimony.”48 The court observed that “under different 
circumstances . . . a limited remand remains available.”49 Read 
together, Christian, StorageCraft, and other similar decisions 
show that there is no need for imposing a rigid limited-remand 
rule when a district court fails to make the appropriate threshold 
determination of admissibility. The current analytical framework 
is functioning as Congress intended, allowing the federal courts 
of appeals to make case-specific decisions.  
46. Cf. United States v. Holloway, 740 F.2d 1373 (6th Cir. 1984) (entertaining appeal 
after remand for district court’s threshold admissibility determination involving application 
of co-conspirator exception to hearsay rule). 
47. 749 F.3d 806 (9th Cir. 2014). 
48. Id. at 813 n.3 (emphasis in original). 
49. Id. at 814 n.3 (noting that a limited remand on the question of prejudice might on 
occasion be proper). 
